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rect, the purchasers have absolutely no title, inasmuch as the estate
tail in the children had not previously been barred.
In taking leave of a subject to which we have already devoted too
much space, we would respectfully submit whether it is not a safer
rule, and less injurious to the rights of property, to hold, as was
always formerly held, that the common law is the law of Pennsylvania except so far as it has been altered by statute directly or by
clear implication. If this be done, lawyers with moderate industry and
good sense can generally advise about wills or otherwise, with almost
a certainty of being right. But if not, if some new system of homesprung Pennsylvania law, which has never received the sanction of
the legislature and is to be found in no code, is to be established,
the whole subject will be at sea, and advice become impossible.
The great astonishment with which the doctrines advanced in Price
vs. Taylor and Williams vs. Leech have been generally received is
a proof, if any were needed, that the latter system is certainly not
adapted to lawyers of merely average capacity.
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EX-PARTE TRUMAN C. EVERTS.
1. The first clause of the 14th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which proTides, that the Supreme, Circuit, and District Courts of the United States, "shall
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not

specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary to the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law, does

not authorize said courts to issue a habeas corpus, unless it is necessary in aid
of jurisdiction; in a case or proceeding there pending.
2. The case of a father claiming the custody of an infant child, is not one in which
a habeas corpus can issue, by a court of the United States, as ancillary to the

exercise of its jurisdiction, under the above cited clause of the Act of '89.
3. Nor can a Circuit Court of the United States take jurisdiction under the 11th
Section of the Act of '89, although the father is a citizen of another state, as
the matter in dispute has no pecuniary value, and cannot be estimated in

money.

-M H. Tilden, for the relator.
Johnson &"Carrol,and Mr. Howard, for respondents.
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The opinion of the court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
LEAVITT, J.-Truman C. Everts, the relator, has filed his peti-

tion in this court, for a writ of habeas corpus, averring that he is
a citizen of Kentucky, and that in 1849 he was married at Dayton, Ohio, to Eloise H. Morrison, and that in September, 1850, a
daughter was born to the parties, named Bessie; that in September, 1856, by reason of the improper conduct of the -wife, a
separation took place between the parties at Toledo, Ohio, about
which time the wife admitted that she had been guilty of adultery;
that the said Everts then took charge of the daughter, and removed
to the city of New York, where the child was placed in the keeping of his relatives, who, from their wealth and respectability, were
fitted to take charge of her nurture and education; that she was
placed at school, and was in all things well cared for, happy, and
making rapid progress in her education; that in June, 1858, upon
the petition of his wife, a proceeding of which he had no notice,
and upon allegations which were altogether false, the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery county, Ohio, rendered a decree
annulling the marriage contract between the parties; that while
the said Everts was absent in Kentucky, his wife and other persons, clandestinely, forcibly, and against the will of the child,
abducted her from the school at which she had been placed, and
the custody of those having charge of her, and removed her to
Dayton, where she is forcibly and unlawfully detained by Mrs.
Everts, Lenox Compton, and Fielding Lowry. The prayer of
the petition is, that a writ of habeas corpus issue, requiring the
said parties forthwith to produce the said child, with the cause of
her detention, and that on the final hearing, she may be restored
to the care and custody of the petitioner.
A writ of habeas corpus issued from this court, according to the
prayer of the petition, which has been served on the parties; and
they have appeared and filed their answers. Lowry states in his
answer, that the child is not, and has not been, since the filing of
the petition, in his custody or under his control. Compton answers
in substance, that he is the stepfather of Mrs. Everts, who brought

EX-PARTE TRUMAN C. EVERTS.

the child to his residence, near Dayton, in June last, where she has
since remained with her mother; and that he is willing, and has
the pecuniary ability to take care of and provide for her till she is
of age. He does not claim the right to detain the child, and
alleges that she there is, and has been, under the exclusive control
and authority of her mother.
Mrs. Everts answers, denying all the allegations of fault or
impropriety of conduct on her part, as set out in the petition.
She admits the custody of the child, and" claims the legal right to
retain her in charge, as her mother; and also, on the ground of
the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery county,
dissolving the marriage contract between her and her husband, and
giving to her the custody of the child. She exhibits the record of
the proceedings in her application for divorce, from which it appears
that Everts being, as averred, a resident of the city of New York,
a summons and copy of the petition was addressed by mail to him
at New York, and publication made of the filing of the petition in
a newspaper printed at Dayton, in accordance with the statute of
Ohio. She also avers, that the facts set forth in her petition as
the grounds of the decree, are true, and were substantiated by
sufficient and credible testimony, and that there was no fraud or
illegality in the proceedings resulting in such decree.
This statement presents, briefly, the points arising in this unfortunate controversy, as exhibited in the petition of the relator, and
the answers of the respondents. Upon these, the inquiries are,
first:--Is the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery county, dissolving the marriage contract between the parties, and awarding alimony and the custody of the child to Mrs.
Everts, so far conclusive as to preclude inquiry into the facts on
which the decree was based, and the evidence touching the question, whether the husband or the wife is the more suitable person to
have the custody and control of the daughter; and second, if the
decree is not conclusive, whether from the facts before the court,
there is sufficient warrant for the order prayed for by the relator,
that the child be taken from the possession of the mother, and
transferred to that of the father.
6
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There is, however, another grave question, prior in the order of
its consideration to those indicated, the decision of which one way
will relieve the court necessarily from the decision of all other questions. The power of this court to entertain jurisdiction of the
pending controversy is denied, and the question which this denial
presents must be first disposed of. Although the want of jurisdiction in this court, on the ground that it is not conferred by the
constitution and laws of the United States, is not presented in the
answers of the respondents, it is strenuously urged by their counsel
in the argument, and may properly now be considered, as upon a
motion to dismiss this proceeding upon the ground stated. And
obviously, if it is made apparent that the court has not jurisdiction,
it is its plain duty to grant this motion. It is perhaps to be regretted, that it was not made at an earlier stage in the proceeding, and
befort the parties were put to the inconvenience and expense of
taking the great mass of testimony on file. But it is a defect which
is not cured by the appearance of the parties and the presentation
of a defence on other grounds. An express waiver of the excepti6n would not authorize the court to proceed, if satisfied it had no
jurisdiction.
The question indicated has been argued at great length, and
with much ability. In support of the jurisdiction of the court,
probably every authority bearing on the question has been adduced,
and the cases and principles referred to have been amplified and
enforced with great ingenuity and learning. And I enter upon its
consideration with a proper sense of its importance, and of the
responsibility assumed in its decision. I may add, that I deeply
regret the unavoidable absence of the circuit judge at the bearing
in this case, which has deprived the parties of the benefit of his
great learning and mature judicial experience in the determination
of this question.
In the outset, I may remark, that it is distinctly conceded by the
counsel for the relator, that-the court must find its warrant for the
jurisdiction claimed, in the constitution and laws of the United
States, No principle can be more definitively settled, than that
the courts of the Union, from the highest to the lowest, are courts
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of limited jurisdiction, in the sense that they can call into action
no powers not expressly conferred by law, or incidental to those
granted. Thus, in Ex-parte Bollman and Swartout, 4 Curtis, 23;
4 Cranch, 75, Chief Justice Marshall says: "Courts which originate in the common law, possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the common law, until some statute shall change their
established principles; but courts which are created by written law,
and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend
that jurisdiction." This principle, thus established at an early day
by the Supreme Court, applicable to the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States, has in numerous cases received the sanction
of that court.
The question now under consideration must therefore be decided
with reference to the legislation of congress, defining the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases of habeas corpus. But, before
noticing the statutory provisions on this subject, it may be well to
state the precise character of the detention or imprisonment alleged
by the relator to be unlawful, and as a remedy for which the action
of this court is sought. The case there briefly stated, as made in
the relator's petition, is that of a father living separate from his
wife, asserting a legal right to the custody of a female child of the
age of eight years, who, he alleges, is illegally detained by the
mother. For the purposes of the present inquiry, it is not material
to refer to the facts involved in this unfortunate domestic controversy. The sole question now under consideration is, whether,
supposing the case as presented in the petition of the relator to be
sustained by the evidence, the interposition of this court, through
the writ of habeas corpus, can be legally invoked.
The claim for the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is based
mainly on the 14th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 vol.
Stat. U. S., 81. This section provides, "that all the before mentioned courts of the United States [the Supreme Court, and the
Circuit and District Courts,] shall have power to issue writs of
scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary to the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
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usages of law. And either of the justices of the Supreme Court,
as well as judges of the District Courts, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an inquiry into the
cause of commitment: provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall
in no case extend to prisoners in jail, unless where they are in
custody, under or by color of the authority of the United States,
or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are
necessary to be brought into court to testify."
The question arising on that clause of the foregoing section,
granting power to all the courts of the United States to issue the
writ of habeas corpus is, whether the limitation expressed in the
words, "all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions,"
includes the writs of scire facias and habeas corpus previously
specified. The counsel for the relator insists, that as to these writs
there is no restriction upon the exercise of jurisdiction, and that
the limitation applies only to "other writs" necessary to the exercise of the .jurisdiction of the courts named. On the other hand,
it is claimed in argument, that this limitation or restriction applies
as -well to the writs specially named as to all others, and that by a
fair construction of the whole clause, the writs authorized are such
only as are required in the proper exercise of jurisdiction. And, if
this latter view is correct, there is clearly no jurisdiction in this
court under the section of the act referred to.
It is not a matter that should excite surprise, that no case is
found in the reports of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
which an authoritative construction has been given to the clause of
the statute under consideration. The Supreme Court, as decided
in Barry's case, 2 Howard, 65, has no original jurisdiction under
that clause, to issue the writ of habeas corpus. While, therefore,
there have been numerous applications to that court for the writ of
habeas corpus, they have been based on the latter clause of the section, and have involved only the exercise of the revisory power of
the court, in passing on the legality and validity of commitments
and imprisonments, under the orders or process of inferior courts.
In the case Ex-parte Bollman et al., before referred to, this
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question was not involved; but Chief Justice Marshall, in giving
the opinion of the court, refers to it, though he does not expressly
decide it. He remarks, that "the only doubt of which this section (14) can be susceptible is, whether the restrictive words of the
first sentence limit the power to the award of such writs of habeas
corpus as are necessary to enable the courts of the United States
to exercise their respective jurisdictions, in some causes which they
are capable of deciding. It has been urged, that in strict grammatical construction, these words refer to the last antecedent, which
is "all other writs not specially provided for by statute." And he
adds, "this criticism may be correct, and is not entirely without its
influence; but the sound construction which the court thinks it
safer to adopt is, that the true sense is to be determined by the
nature of the provision and by the context."
This is a clear intimation, that as a question of mere grammatical
construction, it is not clear of doubt, and availing myself of the
hint given by the chief justice, I have endeavored to attain a conclusion as to the sense of the clause from its nature, and its connection with other parts of the section.
And in the first place it is worthy of remark, that the power to
award the writs of scire facias and habeas corpus, in the first part
of the section, is "to all the before named courts of the United
States," meaning the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts. It is
to be noticed, that all the courts are placed on a footing of equality
as to their power to grant the writs named or referred to. Now, iv
is most obious, that the grant of this power to the Supreme Court
is not within the cases enumerated in the constitution of the United
States, in which that court can exercise original jurisdiction. That
court, in the case ]Efx-parte Barry, 2 Howard, 65, expressly decided.
that it had no original jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus,
in the case of a child allepd by the father to be illegally detained
in the custody and possession of the mother. There is no room for
a doubt as to the correctness of this decision. That court long
since decided, that congress could not confer upon it original jurisdiction in any case not within the specifications in the constitution.
On the ground taken by the counsel for the relator, the clause
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of the statute under consideration authorizes all the courts named
to grant the writ of habeas corpus in any ease where personal
restraint or imprisonment of the person is alleged, without restriction or limitation. Our present inquiry is, -whether it was within
the intention of the Act of Congress of '89 to clothe those courts
with such a jurisdiction. And, assuming the affirmative of this
inquiry, we charge on that congress the folly of attempting to confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, in palpable conflict
with the constitution of the United States. I do not suppose that
such a suspicion can attach to the distinguished statesmen who composed that congress. It was the first congress convened after the
adoption of the constitution of the United States, and not a few of
its most influential members had been prominent in the convention
that framed that instrument. Of these men, it may be well said,
that for sagacity, statesmanship and profound learning, they have
had no superiors in any after period of our history, and we should
be slow in admitting that they could have sanctioned an intended
violation of the constitution. At all events, such a conclusion
should rest on a firmer basis, than a doubtful question of grammatical construction.
But there is no occasion for any inference in the least discreditable to the intelligence or purity of the Congress of '89. No
violence was intended, and in my judgment none is committed on
the constitution by the clause of the statute under consideration.
Its language fairly imports a power in the courts of the United
States, to grant the writ of habeas corpus, and all pther writs
proper and necessary in the just exercise of their jurisdiction.
And, I can see nothing in the grammatical construction of the
clause that calls for any other sense than I have indicated. There
was an apparent propriety in designating the important writs of
scire facias and habeas corpus; and then, to avoid prolixity and
the useless specification of all the other writs and processes necessary to the salutary exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts to
adopt the comprehensive form of expression, " all other writs."
These latter words, by every rule of grammatical construction, are
connected with, and refer to the writs of scire facias and habeas
corpus before named.
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There is another consideration in the construction of the statute,
which is -entitled to great weight. As already noticed, in the first
clause of the section, the power to grant the writ of habeas corpus
is to the courts and not to a single judge; while in that clause of
the section, authorizing the writ. "for the purpose of an inquiry
into the cause of commitment," any judge of any of the courts is
empowered to award it. When the mind is directed to the inquiry
why this distinction is made, the answ.r is plain and obvious. If
the power to grant a habeas corpus is given in the first clause of
the section only where necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction
of a court, there is great propriety, if not necessity, that the writ
should be ordered by the court, and not by a single judge. The
clause, beyond question, contemplates the grant of the writ, for the
enforcement of jurisdiction in some proceeding or case pending in
the court, in which the writ is prayed for. And that court alone,
in its capacity as a court, and not a single judge, is best qualified
to decide, judicially, whether the writ is necessary to enforce its
jurisdiction. On the other hand, when the great prerogative writthe writ of liberty-the writ of habeas corpus ad subjeciendumthe writ authorizing an inquiry into the cause of commitment, provided for in the second clause of the statute, is referred to, any
judge of. any of the courts is empowered to grant it. The reason
of this is, that when a case of unlawful imprisonment, under color
of legal process or authority exists, there is a necessity for prompt
and speedy action; and hence the party is entitled to be heard
befora a single judge, without waiting a regular session of a court,
which might be months distant, and at a point remote from the place
of the imprisonment of the party applying for deliverance. That
this was the writ contemplated by the authors of the constitution,
in the clause which prohibits its suspension except in certain emergencies, is quite obvious. They could have had no reference to the
writ, as used to relieve from either actual or constructive restraints
or imprisonments of the person, resulting from the relations of
master and servant, guardian and ward, parent and child, or husband and wife. It was doubtless intended to protect against those
invasions of personal liberty, which are perpetuated under color of
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legal or official authority. The framers of the constitition had in
view those outrages and usurpations which characterized the worst
periods in the history of the British nation, by which the personal
liberty of the citizen was invaded from political considerations, and
with the forms of legal authority. As a remedy for such abuses of
power, and disregard of legal and constitutional rights, the judges
of the courts of the United States are invested with the authority
to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and inquire into the cause of
commitment.
And, under the clause referred to there is no limitation to the
power of the judges, except that contained in the proviso, which
prohibits them from granting a habeas corpus where the imprisonment is by state process, or under state authority. As before intimated, the numerous authorities cited by counsel, refer to cases
where the writ has issued under the clause here referred to; and
these cases need not therefore be specially noticed, as they have no
application to the question under consideration.
It is claimed, however, that there are other cases which sustain
the jurisdiction now asserted for this court. The case of United
States vs. Green, 8 Mas6n's Rep., 482, has been cited in support
of the position assumed by the counsel for the relator. It was a
case of habeas corpus, presenting a question as to the rightful custody of an infant daughter, alleged to be wrongfully detained by
the grandfather of the child. It is true, the writ in that case was
allowed by Judge Story, in the Circuit Court; but it does not
appear, that either on the petition for the writ, or upon its return,
the question of jurisdiction was presented. And before any final
action by the court, the parties entered into an amicable arrangement as to the custody of the child, which received the sanction of
the court. This cannot be claimed as an authoritative decision, on
the point now before this court.
It is also insisted, that the case Ex-parte Barry, before referred
to, is in support of the jurisdiction of this court. The only point
decided in that case was, that the Supreme Court of the United
States had no original jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus prayed for, and that court therefore dismissed the proceed-
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ing. In the opinion by Judge Story, the court say: "Without,
therefore, entering into the merits of the present application, we
are compelled by our duty to dismiss the petition, leaving the
petitioner to seek redress in such other tribunal of the United
States as may be entitled to grant it." This is but an intimation
that the lower courts might have jurisdiction, but the question did
not arise in the case, and can not be claimed as a decision by the
Supreme Court.
The case of the United States, on the relation of Wheeler vs.
Passmore Williamson, 4 Am. Law Reg., page 5, is also relied on
as an authority by the counsel for the relator. This case was
decided by the late Judge Kane, of the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The
circumstances under which the writ issued, were briefly as follows: '"'heeler, the relator, was the owner of three slaves, who, as
he alleged in his petition, were forcibly taken from his possession
at Philadelphia by Williamson, and by him were unlawfully detained
in custody. The prayer of the petition was, that Williamson might
be required to produce the slaves before the court, with the reasons
of his claim to detain them. The learned judge held that the court
bad jurisdiction under the first clause of the 14th section of the
Act of '89. I do not propose to notice critically the grounds on
which he asserted the jurisdiction of the court. For reasons stated
before, I am clear in the opinion, that the construction given by
Judge Kane to the statute in question is essentially erroneous.
With all my respect for his legal intelligence and ability, I cannot
acquiesce in his conclusions. And the authority of his opinion in
that case is certainly not strengthened by the fact that no other
has been reported in which this latitudinous claim of jurisdiction
has been judicially affirmed.
In at least one case of respectable authority, a contrary doctrine
has been strongly asserted, I refer to the case Ex parte Barry,
before noticed, in which Judge Betts, holding the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Southern District of New York, refused
to grant a writ of habeas corpus in a case, the facts of which were
very similar to those now before this court, on the ground of a
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want of jurisdiction. The case was substantially, that Barry, an
alien, married in the city of New York; and having lived some
years with his wife, and after two children were born, by reason of
some unfortunate difficulty between them, they separated, one of
the children being in the custody of the father and the other of the
mother. In 1844, Barry, for the purpose of obtaining the custody
of the child iemaining with the mother, filed his petition in the
Circuit Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging a lawful right to the child as the father, and that the child
was illegally and forcibly detained by the mother. Judge Betts
refused to award the writ, on the ground before stated. I have
seen no full report of his opinion, but it is referred to in 5 Howard,
103, and from the report it appears that Barry obtained a writ of
error from the Supreme Court, to reverse the judgment of Judge
Betts. This writ was dismissed by the Supreme Court, on the
ground that there was no pecuniary amount in controversy, and
that the court therefore had not jurisdiction. Two of the points of
Judge Betts' decision are stated in the report of that case as follows: "I deny the writ of habeas corpus prayed for, because,1. If granted, and a return was made, admitting the facts stated in
the petition, I should discharge the infant on the ground that the
court cannot exercise the common law functions of parenspatrice,
and has no common law jurisdiction in the matter. 2. The court
has not judicial cognizance of the matter, by virtue of any statute
of the United States.
The conclusions thus stated by Judge Betts accord fully w*ith my
judgment. I have before given some of the reasons for the opinion,
that the statute does not grant the power claimed for the court, in
this case. And that view is, I think, decisive of the pending question. But it is contended in argument, that if it should be held
that the statute does not confer the power, as a matter of substantive and independent jurisdiction, the writ of habeas corpus properly
issued as an ancillary process, to enable the court to exercise jurisdiction. If I understand the argument on this point, it is, in substance, that the child who is the subject of this controversy, legally
owes labor and service to the petitioner, as her father; that she

EX-PARTE TRUMAN C. EVERTS.

has escaped from the State of New York, where such labor and
service were due, into the State of Ohio, and is subject to reclamation as a fugitive, by the father, under the acts of Congress of
1793 and 1850; and that the writ issued in this case is in aid of
the jurisdiction of this court, under said acts, and therefore within
the scope of the first clause of the 14th section of the act of 1789.
I shall notice this position very briefly, remarking, in the first place,
that it would be, in my judgment, a perverted construction of the
acts for reclaiming fugitives from service, to hold that they can
have any application to a female child of eight years of age. Such
a child, within the contemplation of these statutes cannot be said
to owe labor and service to the father. And again, it is clear there
has been no such escape as within the purview of these statutes is
required, to bring a person within their operation.
There must be an escape, implying the will or purpose to escape,
which certainly cannot be predicated of an infant child. But there
is a still more conclusive objection to the construction insisted on.
The clause authorizing a habeas corpus in aid of the jurisdiction of
a court, clearly contemplates a suit or proceeding in esse, and that
such writ is necessary as subsidiary to the exercise of jurisdiction.
It would vest the courts with a dangerous amplitude of discretion,
if they could use the writ of habeas corpus as an instrument to
bring a party within its jurisdiction for an ulterior purpose.
The jurisdiction, then, does not exist on the ground just indicated-and I am equally clear there is no other ground on which
it can be sustained. I do not say, it is not within the competency
of Congress to give the power claimed to the courts or judges of
the United States. The constitution includes in the grant of judicial power, controversies between citizens of different States, but
there is no statutory provision which brings the proceeding by
habeas corpus within the scope of this provision. The 11th section
of the act of 1789 gives to the Circuit Courts original cognizance
concurrently with the State courts, of all civil suits at common
law and in equity, where the plaintiff is a citizen of a State other
than that in which suit is brought, and the matter in dispute exceeds five hundred dollars. But this does not include a proceeding
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by habeas corpus, for the plain reason, if there were no other, that
the matter in controversy has no pecuniary value; and cannot be
estimated in money.
It follows as the result of these views, that this proceeding must
be dismissed, for want of jurisdiction. If I entertained a serious
doubt on this question, I should hesitate to exercise the power invoked for this court. But, in the light in which I view it, the line
of duty is so clearly indicated, that I should be wholly without
excuse if I did not follow it.
This result renders it wholly unnecessary to express an opinion
as to the effect of the record in the proceeding in the State court,
or to review the evidence introduced by the parties.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Pittsburg; October and
November, 1858.
THE COMMIONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA EX REL. J. T. THOMAS VS. THE
COMMISSIONERS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.
1. At common law the relator might move to disallow the return to a mandamus,
and if deemed insufficient a peremptory mandamus would be allowed, but since
the statute of June, 1886, the relator must either demur, plead, or traverse to
the return.
2. Mandamus is the only adequate remedy for a municipal bondholder against
public officers, in case those officers refuse to assess and collect the tax to meet
the interest on said bond, when the law requires them to do so.
8. The fact that 300 bond creditors would be required to sue twice a year lor their
interest, would render the ordinary common law action for debt an inadequate
remedy.
4. Mandamus is the proper remedy whenever an act of Parliament or the Legislature gives power, or imposes an obligation on particular persons to do some particular act or duty, and provides no specific legal remedy for non-performance.
6. The allegation of a return to a writ of mandamus must be direct, and stated in
the most unqualified manner, not argumentatively.
6. The negotiation of bonds ata rate below that prescribed bylaw does not invalidate
them; but qwsre, whether a municipal corporation might not obtain equitable
relief by means of a reduction of their amount to the sum actually paid, provided
a proper case could be made before a chancellor.
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7. Although doubts may have been entertained by a minority of the court at a
i'ormcr period, as to the constitutionality of a municipal subscription for general
railroad purposes, yet after the announccment of a solemn judicial decision by a
majority of the court, the question is to be considered at rest.

The case was argued by
Mferedith and Harding, for relators, and
Williams, for respondent.
The relator was the owner of two bonds, of 1,000, of the
issue made by Allegheny County, in the Steubenville Railroad
Company, on each of which interest was due and unpaid. The
County Commissioners are by law required to make provision for
the payment of the principal and interest as in other cases of loan
to said county. The writ sets forth the law authorizing the issue
of the bonds, the failure and neglect of the County Commissioners
to make provision for the payment of the interest, the ownership
by relator of two bonds on which interest was due, and commands
the defendants to include in their next annual assessment the interest on the entire issue of $300,00, so that provision would
be thus made for the relator's interest as well as that of all other
bond holders claiming under the same issue. The return made by
defendants set up argumentative defences to some of the material
allegations of the writ; to others it set up a denial on information
and belief; and also alleged specifically that the original negotiation of the bonds was in violation of an express requisition of the
statute authorizing their issue. The return also alleged the existence of adequate relief for the relator, by the ordinary course of
common law, and denied entirely the constitutionality of the original issue of bonds.
The argument was heard before the full court on a motion by the
relator's counsel, to disallow the return for insufficiency, and to
grant a peremptory writ of mandamus.
Earding and lfereo'ith for relator.-A motion to disallow the
return and to grant a peremptory writ, is equivalent to a demurrer
so far as to raise all questions as to insufficiency of return; but
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it does not impose on relator the alternative of admitting the truth
of any allegation as set forth in return.
It is the common law mode of proceeding; has been repeatedly
followed in this State, and the language of the Act of Assembly of
1836 does not expressly take it away, but merely provides certain new and optional modes of replying to a return not admitted
at common law.
This is a proper case for mandamus. Wherever a statute or Act
of Parliament imposes a specific legal duty or obligation on any
person, and provides no spebific penalty in case of their failure to
perform that duty, the court will, in order to prevent failure of justice, grant a writ of mandamus to compel the doing of such act or
duty. Tapping on Nandamus, 30, and cases collected there. On
this principle, the Court of King's Bench have granted writs of
mandamus to compel assessment of county and church rates. Tapping, 66 and 103.
Mandamus is the only adequate remedy for relator. First,
because it is the only mode by which he can obtain the specific
relief sought for, viz: the assessment of the tax. The relator does
not ask to be paid a certain sum of money, but merely to have
provision made for the payment of matured interest on all the
$300,000 (three hundred thousand dollars) worth of bonds of the
Steubenville issue. Second, the relief here asked for is not against
the county, but against the County Commissioners. This distinction was recognized as a good one in the case of Graham et al.
vs. Maddox, reported in the July number of the Law Register.
An examination of the allegations of the defendants' return show
them to be argumentative and insufficient, and therefore bad. The
law requires a return to a mandamus to be certain and specific, not
hypothetical or argumentative.
The constitutionality of the original issue of the bonds was finally
decided in this court in Sharpless vs. The City of Philadelphia,and
the subsequent amendment of the constitution was a ratification of
that decision.
The fact that some bonds were negotiated below their par value
is no answer to the relator's writ. The county officers stood by and
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permitted them to be issued and to pass into the hands of the public.
If the issue was not authorized at first, it was the duty of the County
Commissioners then to have interfered by an application for an injunction.
Williams, in reply-objected to the mode of proceeding.
The relator should have demurred under the act of 1836.
The return alleges that the bonds were negotiated below par, and
the relator does not deny this. This is sufficient to invalidate them.
The allegations made by the respondents in their return, are a sufficient answer to each and all of the allegations of the writ.
There is not only a specific remedy at common law, but an exclusive remedy. The original issue of the bonds was unconstitutional.
In the case of Sharpless vs. The City of Philadelphia,two judges
dissented. The opinion of the majority cannot, therefore, be considered as settling the question. There have been several changes
in the constitution of the court since that decision, and in a case involving so great a principle, the court should reconsider the subject.
Mr. W. then reviewed at considerable length the decisions of the
several judges in the case of Sharpless vs. The City of Philadelphia.
WOODWARD, J.-On the 21st day of May last, this Court, at the
instance and on the complaint of Joseph T. Thomas, as relator,
awarded an alternative mandamus against the Commissioners of
the county of Allegheny, requiring them to proceed under the Acts of
Assembly relating to county rates and levies, and make provision
for the payment of the interest accrued and accruing on certain
bonds issued by the county, to the aggregate amount of $300,000,
two of which the relator holds, or show adequate cause for their
not doing so. To this writ the commissioners have made a return,
the sufficiency of which is hereafter to be noticed. The counsel
for the relator deeming it insufficient, have moved the court to
disallow it, and to award a peremptory mandamus, and on this
motion argument has been fully heard by the counsel of the respective parties.
This motion is according to the course of the common law of
mandamus, but by statute both in England and Pennsylvania, an
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tinsatisfactoTy return is now required to be applied to by a demurrer,
plea or traverse. Under our statute, the case then assumes the
form of an ordinary action at law, and all questions properly arising
are to be tried in the same manner as was formerly done at common
law, in the action for a false return. If judgment be given for
the party suing the writ, a peremptory writ of mandamus issues
without delay, as if the return had been adjudged insufficient. At
common law a judgment is not necessary to support the peremptory
Nrit-under our statute it is.
Such, in brief, is the statutory mode of proceeding in suits of
mandamus, and because itis expressly enjoined by our Act of 14th
June, 1836, and necessary also for the sake of the symmetry of the
record, we shall treat the motion and argument made on behalf of
the relator as a demurrer to the return of the respondents, and
proceed to consider the case as if it had been entered in form.
The sufficiency of the return is thus fairly raised upon the
record. Before proceeding to test it, however, it is necessary to
obtain a clear view of the grounds on which the relatoi has instituted the action.
He claims to be the owner, in his own right, of two bonds
or certificates of loan, executed by the commissioners of
Allegheny county, on the 15th day of July, 1853, under the
seal of said county, for $1,000 each payable to the Pittsburgh
and Steubenville Railroad Company, or bearer, on the fifteenth
day of July, 1885, with interest at the rate of six per cent. per
annum, payable semi-annually, on the fifteenth day of January
and July, at the city of New York, upon presentation and
le complains that
surrender of the coupons thereto annexed.
the county has wholly and wrongfully neglected to make any
provision for the payment of the interest on said bonds. Our
alternative mandamus, founding itself on the matters charged by
the relator, recites an Act of Assembly of 1849, incorporating the
Pittsburgh and Steubenville Railroad Company, and a supplement
thereto of 26th of July, 1853, authorizing the county of Allegheny, through its commissioners and upon the recommendation
of one grand jury, to subscribe an amount not exceeding ten
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thousand shares to the capital stock of said company-to borrow
money to pay therefor, and to make provision for the principal and
interest of the money so borrowed, as in the cases of loans to
said county. The writ further recites the recommendation of the
grand jury, of June term, 1853, that the county should subscribe
an amount not exceeding ten thousand shares to the capital stock
of the said company-the fact of a subscription of 6,000 shares-and
the issue of bonds therefor in the gross amount of $300,000, in.
amount respectively of $1,000 each, and that the two bonds of the.
relator, issued as part payment of said subscription, were transferred by the Railroad Company in conformity with the aforesai
Act of Assembly of 1853, as well as of two other Acts approvedI
TMarch 2d, 1855, and Iarch 27, 1855. It charges, also, that a
large amount of interest is due and unpaid.
Such is the relator's case. It is an appropriate case for mandamus. He does not ask that judgment be rendered for him for the
amount of the unpaid interest, but simply'that public officers-the
fiscal agents of the county of Allegheny-clothed by law with the
power of assessing and collecting taxes to the extent of one cent
in the dollar of the adjusted valuation of taxable property in the.
county, shall be required to provide means for paying that interest
in the same manner they provide for paying other debts of the.
county.
It is obvious that he has no other adequate legal remedy. The
Acts of Assembly relating to county rates and levies impose no.
specific penalty upon the commissioners for the neglect of such
duties as the relator calls on them to perform, and if a penaltywere provided it is well settled that it would not supersede the
remedy of mandamus. If the relator were demanding payment
merely of his interest, he might indeed sue by action of debt, but
so might every holder of any of the three hundred bonds, and thus
every six months would bring down upon the county an avalanche of
law suits that would be destructive to her treasury. And a remedy
that would require three hundred creditors to sue twice a year for interest could scarcely be regarded as adequate. The law is bound to.
furnish some better means, even if immediate payment were the

08

COMMONWEALTH vs. COMMISSIONERS OF ALLEGHENY CO.

thing sought. But where that is not the immediate object, but
the.relator only seeks to put the county commissioners in motion,
to execute duties devolved on them by law, neither the action of
debt nor any other ordinary action is adequate. I need not consider whether he had any remedy in equity, for, according to the
best authorities, both English and American, the existence of an
equitable remedy is not a ground for refusing mandamus.
Although mandamus is usually spoken of as an extraordinary
remedy, and it is so in the sense that it lies only where there is a
clear legal right and no adequate remedy for it at law, yet since
the time of Lord Mansfield it has grown into great use in England,
and the effect of the various decisions is said to be that the Court
of King's Bench, as the general guardian of public rights, and in
exercise of its authority to grant the writ, will render it, as far as
it can, the suppletory means of substantial justice in every case
where there is no other specific legal remedy for a legal right, and
will provide as effectually as it can, that all official duties are fulfilled wherever the subject matter is properly within its control.-Originally, mandamus was a mere letter missive from the king to a
subordinate functionary, commanding the performance of his duty,
then it became a legislative power, and finally was committed to the
Court of King's Bench as a judicial remedy, and as such it has
been extensively and beneficially applied. Thus it is a general
rule, that whenever an act of parliament gives power to or imposes
an obligation on a particular person, to do some particular act or
duty, and provides no specific legal remedy for non-performance,
the court will, in order to prevent a failure of justice, grant the
writ to command the doing of such act or duty. The books abound
with instances of the writ directed to inferior courts, magistrates
and local authorities, commanding them to execute acts of the Legislature. So the ordinary has often been commanded to grant
letters testamentary and of administration-bishops to institute
clergy-aldermen and burgesses to proceed in the execution of
their official duties-incorporated companies to execute charter
powers, and church wardens to make and raise one or more rates
por the re-payment of money,. and its interest, borrow on the credit
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of the parish. It lies also to command a municipal corporation, to
enforce payment of existing borough rates, and to make and cause
to be collected, another borough rate, wherewith to pay instalments
on a composition bond; and in a case in Strange's Reports 63, it
was held to lie commanding the making of a county rate.
Instances might be multiplied of the frequent resort to this writ
in England, to enforce execution of official duties, especially those
of a fiscal nature-involving the taxing power, but they will be found
collected and arranged under appropriate heads in Tapping on
Mandamus, to which I refer, passim, and it is not necessary that I
should cite more.
For a succinct view of the law of this writ as it prevails in the
United States, I refer to Angell & Ames on Corporations-title
Mandamus.
In this court the writ has been often discussed, -and in many instances applied. The general rule with us is, that where a ministerial act is to be done, and there is no other specific remedy, a
mandamus will be granted to do the act required. Griffith vs. Cochran, 5 Bin. 87, 103; Oor. vs. Cochran, 1 S. & R., 473; Com. vs.
Johnson, 2d Bin., 275. See also, 2 Bin., 362; 16 S. & R., 317;
2 Penn. R., 518 ; 4 Casey, 108.
I refer also to the case of Graham et al. vs. HAaddox et al.,
lately decided in the Circuit Court of Mason county, Kentucky, and reported in the American Law Begister, for August,
1858, where in a case bearing in many points a striking resemblance to the one before us, the law of mandamus was discussed
with learning and ability, and the full remedial power of the writ
applied.
From all these sources it is abundantly apparent that the case
presented by the relator is a fit one for mandamus, unless grounds
be disclosed in the return for withholding it.
And this brings us to a consideration of the matters alleged in
the return.
The first thing to be remarked on looking into the return is, that
the commissioners nowhere in it deny either expressly or by implication, the execution of the bonds in question. Nor is their de-
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livery to the Railroad Company in payment of the county subscription, denied. So far forth, then, as the execution and delivery of
the instruments of indebtedness can bind the county, she is bound,
for execution and delivery are unquestioned.
Another observation is, that many of the pleas or allegations of
the return are wanting in that pertinency, directness and certainty
which the law requires.
At common law the certainty required in returns to mandamus
was as strict as that which governed estoppels, indictments, or
returns to writs of habeas corpus, and the statute of 9th Anne C.
20, though it relieved the process of many of its common law peculiarities, did not take away the strictness of return which the
common law required. Our legislation has not touched the point.
But the Court of King's Bench (now properly called the Queen's
Bench) have gradually relaxed the common law rule, and at this
day the certainty required is said to be certainty to a certainintent
in general, which means that which upon a fair and reasonable con*struction may be called certain without recurring to possible facts
that do not appear. And every allegation of a return must be
direct, and be stated in the most unqualified manner, not inferentially or argumentatively, but with certainty and plainness-Tapping,
.854, 857..
The jurisdictions of this court are derived from the constitution
-and legislature of Pennsylvania, but the measure of the extent of
-its jurisdiction is according to that of the Queen's Bench and the
Exchequer Chamber in England, so that we naturally follow the
-former. tribunal in the rules that obtain in mandamus pleadings.Taking the rule that requires certainty and directness to a reasonable intent in general, it will be found as we proceed with the
,analysis of the return before us that itis a defective return in
many particulars. The several parts of it may be regarded as so
-many pleas, and may be numbered and stated as follows:
1. It first sets out that the grand jury did not recommend a
subscription of any "given amount" of the shares of the stock
of said company.
The irrelevancy of this will be seen not only from the general
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views hereafter to be expressed in reference to the third plea, but
from the absence of any allegation on the part of the 'relator that
the grand jury recommended any "given amount." Re does not
allege it, and he was under no necessity to allege it, for the act of
assembly did not require the grand jury to specify or designate
the amount of the subscription. The act authorized the county to
subscribe an amount not exceeding ten thousandshares on the recommendation of the grand jury. The relator charges that the
grand jury recommended a subscription not exceeding ten thousand
shares, and that the commissioners made a subscription of six
thousand. It is manifest that the plea meets nothing contained in
this charge, and amounts to nothing as a defence, because the law
-did not impose on the grand jury, as in the ease of 3lierer county
vs. The Pittsburgh and Erie Railroad Company, 3 Casey, 390,
the duty of designating the subscription to be made. It simply
required the grand jury's approbation of the subscription contemplated by the act, and the relator charges that such approbation
was obtained, and a subscription made within it. But this first
plea proceeds to charge that ifany subscription was made, one bond
was issued therefor in the sum of three hundred thousand dollars,
and that the several bonds recited in the writ, if issued at a, were
issued without authority of law, and not in payment of the supposed
subscription of three hundred thousand dollars.
Now, if duplicate securities were agreed upon between the parties,
and made, this would not impair the obligation of either of those
securities. And if the subscription and bonds alleged were not made,
or the commissioners meant to tender an issue on that point, they
should have put in a direct denial. They put in hypothetically,
but issues are not formed to try hypotheses, but facts. No fact is
so charged here as to be capable of investigation on an issue. If
it be said that the unlawfulness of the bonds in suit is the fact
charged, the answer is that they are charged to be unlawful only
if they were issued, which is a mode of pleading much below the
rule of certainty and directness which we have seen the law requires.
This plea must be adjudged insufficient.
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2. And the second is worse still, because totally irrelevant.
The commissioners plead, on information and belief, that other
bonds, amounting to the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, were
'subsequently issued to the Railroad Company without authority of
law.
What was this plea intended to answer ? The relator says
nothing about an issue of $200,000 of bonds-pretends to hold no
bonds of such an issue, and asks for no judgment or action of this
court in respect of it. If in point of form, this were regarded as
a sufficient tender of an issue, it would be an issue outside of the
record, and therefore irrelevant and impertinent.
3. We come now in the third place to the most important part
of the return. Matters are herein pleaded with tolerable certainty,
which suggest questions of the gravest import.
The commissioners refer to the provision of the Act of Assembly
of 24th February, 1853, which forbade the bonds or certificates
thereby authorized, to be sold at less than the par value thereof,
and then they allege that the bonds were in all cases disposed of in
violation of the said condition.
The amendment to this plea denies that the bonds of the relator,
or of any of the $300,000 issue, were sold or transferred by the
Railroad Company in conformity with either the last mentioned
Act or the Acts of 2d and 27th of March, 1855, as averred in the
writ-or that any resolution was adopted by the commissioners, as
charged; to dispense with the provisions of the first of the above named
acts, and the plea goes on to charge that the bonds were spld and
transferred before the passage of the two last mentioned acts, and in
open disregard of the irst of said acts. The force of the facts
here alleged will be appreciated when it is remembered that the
Act of 24th February, 1853, in conferring authority on the commissioners to make the subscription, appended the condition " that
said bonds or certificates of loan shall not be sold at less than the
yarralue thereof." The subsequent Acts of March, 1855, modified this condition so that the company might sell below par "provided that no sale shall be consummated until the commissioners of
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the county which issued the bonds shall have, by resolution, determined the lowest price at which said Railroad Company may
sell the same; said resolution to be recorded in the minutes of their
proceedings.
Now the relator alleges compliance with these provisions, and
sets forth an extract from the minutes of commissioners to the
effect that on the 8th day of April, 1855, they passed resolutions
reciting the above named Acts of March, 1855-the subscriptions
on behalf of the county to several railroad companies, the Pittsburgh and Steubenville included-and the desire of the commissioners not to hinder or delay the work on said roads, but rather
to push it forward to completion for the purpose of strengthening
their security for the semi-annual payment of interest on the certificates of stock issued by said companies to said counties-and
that thereupon they resolved that the said companies "may sell any
county bonds in their hands belonging to them, and which were received in payment of subscription to the capital stock of said companies, at not less than seventy-eight cents on the dollar.
In this manner, the relator deduces the right of himself and
other bondholders to purchase the bonds at seventy-eight cents in
the dollar; but all this the respondents deny. They deny the resolutions of the commissioners, and the sale of any bonds under
them, and allege that the relator, and all who with him, are interested in the $800,000 loan, got their bonds not only before the
alleged action of the commissioners, but before the law was passed
that authorized them to reduce the price below par.
The demurrer must be taken as admitting facts so precisely
pleaded. The Acts of March, 1855, and the action of the county
commissioners reducing the price of the bonds, are thus put out of
the case, and it must be assumed that the bonds were sold before
the Acts of 1855 were passed, and in violation of the condition contained in the Act of 1853. Then the question which the record
presents is this :-Are the commissioners of the county bound to
provide for the interest of bonds duly issued by them, but which
h,.ve been sold by the Railroad Company for less maney than they
were required by law to demand for them.
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If they are, this plea, though sufficient in form, is immaterial in
subsistance, and must be disregarded-if they are not, the relator
has no right to a peremptory mandamus. The county of Allegheny,
though not strictly a municipal corporation, because it possesses
within itself no legislative powers, is nevertheless a body politic with
many corporate powers. It has a common seal ; is capable of
contracting, of taking and holding property, real and personal,
and of. suing and being sued. Its corporate powers, says our Act
of 15th of April, 1834, shall be exercised by the county commissioners. The building of Railroads outside of the county was
never germain4 to the purposes of the institution, nor within its
general corporate powers. But the county was capable of accepting
such augmentation of its powers at the hands of the legislature
as would enable it to assist outside railroads. Whether the legislature might constitutionally confer such powers, is another question,
which will be noticed hereafter ; but assuming, for the present, the
right of the legislature to grant them, the capacity of the county
to accept and exercise them, cannot reasonably be doubted; for, be
it remembered, counties are creations of the legislature, and the
powers with which the creature shall be endowed, must be referred
to the same absolute will that brings the creature into being. If
the creator does not possess powers to bestow, that is one thing, but
if possessing them they are bestowed, there is an end of the
question as to the right to exercise them. Empowered to subscribe
to the capital stock of the Pittsburg and Steubenville Railroad
Company, and the subscription made in accordance with the legislative will, no contract could be more obligatory. The authorized
mode of .making the subscription good was by the issue of such
certificates of loan or bonds as the relator holds. The respondents
do not deny that the certificates or bonds were executed and delivered in satisfaction of the subscription. The county has got the
stock, which was the consideration of the subscription. The certificates or bonds on the face of them pledge the "faith, credit and
property of the county," for the payment of both principal and
interest. The pledge is as absolute for the interest as for the principal. It was a public loan on the faith of the public credit.-
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Such loans are common not only on the part of our general and
state governments, but among all organized states of the civilized
world, and there is no sentiment on which mankind are more united
than on the inviolability of such public pledges. And the sentiment is very sound, for repudiation of public obligations is sure to
be followed by social disorders and general decay of private morals.
A pledge of the public faith ranks as an imperfect obligation, because no action at law ordinarily lies to enforce it. The state or
community may furnish a qualified remedy against itself, but unless
it did so the contract is remediless.
Everything beyond this must be referred to the arbitrament of
the sword. But because all ordinary remedies are lacking, the
obligation is considered all the more sacred. In the revolution of
governments, whatever dynasty goes up or down, the public debt
remains, and is always recognized by the existing government.The strongest state of Europe is not strong enough to repudiate
her debt. The weakest and most contemptible is not base enough.
The state of Pennsylvania has been sorely tried at several periods
of her history, but she has never tarnished her fame by entertaining
for an instant the thought of repudiation. When she could not
pay, she has issued scrip bearing an interest that would compensate
the creditor for delay-has taken effectual measures for payment at
the earliest possible period, and she has uniformly measured the
extent of her obligations by the official acts of her official agents,
without regard to the fidelity, the wisdom, or the prudence of those
agents. Herein she has furnished an example for all her sisters of
the confederacy, and for all the counties, cities, townships and boroughs within her borders, an example worthy of universal imitation, and which no county is better able to imitate than this
wealthy county of Allegheny.
The condition prescribed by the Act of 1853 was a rule to the
Railroad Company. They were not to dispose of the county bonds
at less than par, and the county might have restrained them by injunction from doing so, as several counties have lately done. But
she stood by in silence and suffered them to be disposed of without
notice to the public, remonstrance to the company, or appeal to the
courts.
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Under these circumstances, the question arises, is she bound to
provide for the interest ? We unhesitatingly answer, Yes, she is.
The bonds were marketable articles-they were made for the
markets of such securities-and the county having permitted the
company to put them into the market, and still allowing them to
stand before the world as genuine pledges of the faith of the county
unquestioned, and as if unquestionable, it is the plainest of all
dictates, whether of morals or of law, that she should provide for
the accrued and accruing interest.
To this extent her obligation is a present one, and imperative.She cannot neglect, postpone or repudiate it, without stain on her
good name, more dark than the-smoke of her industry.
Notwithstanding all this alleged in the pleas under consideration,
we hold the commissioners bound to do what the relator calls on
them'to do. And we will not allow ourselves to doubt that it will
be done cheerfully and effectually, without the exigency of a peremptory writ. If, however, we are mistaken in this conviction ; if
the commissioners shall deliberately resolve to imperil the character of the industrious, thrifty, respectable community whom they
represent, they must expect the law to exhaust its powers to bring
them to a better mind.
But whilst we thus overrule the third plea, we do not underrate
the importance of the facts therein alleged. And we will not hesitate in a case of so much public concern to express ourselves freely
in respect to them, without intending, however, to commit the
judgment of the court on any future question that may arise.
We regard the allegations in that plea, if susceptible of proof,
as possible ground for an equitable defalcation, on behalf of the
county against the principal of the debt.
Let us contemplate then, a little, in this aspect:
The stipulation that the bonds should be sold at par was not unreasonable. It was a becoming expression of confidence in the
faith and ability of the county, and was calculated to repress those
scandalous speculations of stock jobbers which are a disgrace of
our generation, and which have ruined many a meritorious enterprise. The county had a right to contract upon that condition, and
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she did contract on that condition. She plighted her faith on no
other. She did not say she would pay the bonds whatever they
sold at, but if they were transferred before the 8th of April, 1855,
her language was that she would pay them if the purchaser paid
the company their par value. If transferred after that date her
language was, she would pay them if the company received from
the purchaser seventy-eight cents on the dollar. Such was the contract, and nothing more can be made of it. And every holder and
receiver of the bonds had notice at least of the first condition, for
there on the face of the bond it was plainly said it was "given in
pursuance of the act of Assembly, of the 24th of February, 1853."
That act was a public law, of which brokers and their customers
were bound to take notice, as well as other people. In the bond
there was an express reference to the Act, and in the Act the condition was expressed in unmistakable English. The object of the
legislature and of the county was to promote the building of a railroad down the valley of the Ohio, which should remedy the inconveniences which droughts and freshets occasion in river navigation,
and open a steady outlet for the immense productions of the county
to the great markets of the South-West. It was not a scheme of
madness or of folly, but a rational conception and worthy of the helping hand which the county proposed to lend it. Speculators should
have taken notice of these things and should have heeded the legislative guards which were thrown around the undertaking.
Suppose a father willing to help a son in business, lends him his
credit in any form of paper that is not strictly negotiable, but stipulates on the face of it that the son shall not sell it at less than par
and then stands by and sees him selling it at a ruinous discount
without objection. Is there any doubt that in a court of law, the
father would be held to pay the paper, principal and interest according to its tenor? I think he would be a bold lwyer who would deny
it. But suppose the father should go into a court of equity, and
show the violation of the conditions under which he contracted and
offered to pay or renew his paper for the actual amount the son had
received. Would not a chancellor hear him? This is a question
which we are not to decide now, for it is not raised. Perhaps it never
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will be. But should the County Commissioners arouse themselves
from unworthy dreams of repudiation, and bring the Railroad Company
and the holders of these bonds to an account in a court of equity, and
establish the fact that the bonds were disposed of for less money than
the law enjoined, it would be a subject of very serious consideration,
whether the county ought to be required to provide for them, or pay
beyond the sums actually received by the Railroad Company. Why
should she? In seeking equity she would be obliged to do equity, but*
would it not be equitable to have her obligation canceled, upon
restoring to the unlawful purchaser the money he bad paid? What
more could such a purchaser in good conscience claim. Mlay he
compel the county against the tenor of her bond, to pay for that
which neither she nor her beneficiary received. On what principle ?
The negotiability of the bonds ? They are not negotiable instruments within the law merchant; the seal spoils that plea. Nor did
we treat them as such in Carr vs. Le~evre, 3 Casey, 413. The
bonds in that case were not county bonds, but bonds of a private
corporation, and the point ruled was, that when payable to bearer,
they passed by delivery, and carried with him the right of action
in the name of the receiver. But no principle or decision that I
am aware of would necessarily exclude an equitable defence to such
a debt as this, especially if the purchaser is affected by circumstances
of .notice.
Or will it be said that having enforced payment of the interest,
the principal must be enforced of course ? As well might it be argued
that the law having adjudged the right, equity is incapable of restraining or modifying the remedy-a thing which it is the frequent office
of equity to do. To restrain proceedings at law, is one of the largest
heads of equity jurisprudence. The relator, standing in a court of
strict law demands the interest that is nominated in his bond. However he acquired his bonds he is the "bearer," and as such has a
right to demand the interest. The commissioners tender an equitable
defence, but we tell them this is not the time or place to bring it
forward. As long as they leave the body of the securities outstanding and unquestioned, they are incapable of making the defence
upon the incidents. Equity even would not deal with such a defence
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where the suit was only for interest. Much less the law. But let
the whole case be brought into equity, and it may be found that
even-handed justice will require the county to make a new security
for the sums actually received by the company, payable in 1885
with semi-annual interest, and the holders of the bonds to surrender
their bonds for cancelation on receiving that new security. Whatever interest is paid meanwhile will easily admit of equitable
adjustment, when the final account comes.
If this foreshadowing of a possible remedy should lead to action on
the part of the county, she will not be at any loss for parties to sue;
the Railroad Company is at hand, and every owner of bonds will
become 'nown as his semi-annual interest is paid at the county
treasury.
But if the county means to take no effectual action for her relief,
if she will drive her creditors to sheer law, by refusing all performance of her promises, she must be judged by the law. Upon
the law the defence proposed cannot be sustained.
4th. Having said so much (not too much we hope under the peculiar circumstances of the case) upon the main branch of the defence,
it will not require many words to dispose of the 4th and all the
remaining pleas.
The fourth plea is a sort of conjectural interrogatory as to whether
the relator is a bonafide holder of the bonds he claims. His title
is not exactly denied or admitted, but we are asked to put him to
the proof of it. We cannot do it on so uncertain and equivocal a
plea. He alleges positively that he is the owner, and until it is
positively denied he cannot be required to prove his title.
5th. The debt is denied in the 5th plea, which, considering that
the execution of the bonds is not denied, must be taken as an argumentative inference from all that has been previously alleged. _Non
estfactum or its equivalent would have been the appropriate mode
of putting in issue the creation of the debt. If the plea means that
the debt having once existed is extinguished by the circumstances
alleged, that is an argument and not a plea, and as such is condemned by the rules of pleading to which I have heretofore adverted. The remainder of this plea which alleges a specific remedy
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at law is sufficiently answered by what was said in defining the position and rights of the relator.
6th. The sixth plea alleges the corruption of the grand jury and
the County Commissioners in making the alleged subscription,
but in terms quite too general and indefinite for so grave a charge.
This plea was not pressed in the argument, but we were happy to
hear the counsel on the part of the relator explain, without coptradiction, that the sums of money referred to in this plea were paid
for clerical services, and other necessary expenses in preparing
county bonds for issue, not only those in question here, but others
also.
Finally, it is insisted that the Act of Assembly authorizing the
subscription, is unconstitutional and void. I do not mean to discuss
this question; that was done in the &larplesscase.
Several changes have taken place in the membership of this court
since that case was decided, but at no time since could a different
judgment have been obtained. The Acts of Assembly on this subject have never been regarded as wise and wholesome legislation by
any member of the bench; but it must be remembered that a great
deal of vicious legislation may be had within the boundaries of the
Constitution. The constitutional powers of the legislature are not
necessarily as limited as its wisdom. The courts often find themselves unable to set aside Acts of Assembly on constitutional grounds,
which they would be glad to repeal if they had a constitutional veto.
The precedents for this species of legislation are so numerous,
the rights and interests rested on the faith of it so great, and
the reasons in support of its constitutionality so clearly stated in the
case referred to, that we do not feel called on, nor indeed at liberty,
to enter anew into the investigation. Especially is it unnecessary
to do so when the people of Pennsylvania who make our constitutions
have sanctioned the judgment in the Sharpless case by so amending
the constitution as to forbid such legislation in future.
The question should be considered at rest. We cannot agree
with counsel that because it is a constitutional question, it should be
treated as always open. Where the meaning of the constitution on
a doubtful question has been once carefully considered and judicially
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decided, the instrument is to be received in that sense, and every
reason is in favor of a steady adherence to the authoritative interpretation. As the constitution stood, therefore, before the late amendments, it did not forbid such legislation as that under which the
subscription in question was made.
I have thus gone step by step through the'return, and the conclusion of the whole matter is, that judgment must be entered on
the demurrer for the relator.
And now, to wit, Nov. 11th, 1858; this cause came on for hearing and was fully argued by counsel, whereupon the court, after
due consideration, do order and adjudged that judgment be entered
on the demurrer for the relator, and that the respondents Commissioners of the county of Allegheny, be and they are hereby commanded at their next annual meeting for estimating the probable
expenses of said county, to make full and ample provision in their
estimates for raising money to pay the interest on the three hundred hundred thousand dollars of certificates of loan or bonds in the
aforesaid complaint of the relator mentioned and referred to, which
shall at that time be due and unpaid, and that which shall become
due thereon in the year next ensuing such meeting of the said
County Commissioners, and to issue their proper warrants to the
collectors of county rates and levies of the said county, for the collection thereof, as in and and by the several Acts of Assembly in
such cases made and provided, they are authorized and required to
do, and that they cause to be paid out of the treasury of said county
the costs of this suit.
LOWRIE, J.-I concur in every part of the opinion of the court,
by my brother Woodward, that is at all material to this case. But
I did not, when the question was formerly here, believe in the constitutionality of such Acts of Assembly as that which is disputed
here, and have yet learned nothing to change my views as then
expressed ; except that legislators and courts have everywhere
expressed contrary views, and therefore I ought to adhere to my
own with great modesty, if at all. Owing to this belief, the opinion
just delivered appears to my mind inadequate, because it does not
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adequately treat the fundamental question of the cause. I feel this
the more, perhaps, because I am myself a citizen residing in Allegheny
county.
It seems to me also, that it must appear inadequate to the minds
of the people of Allegheny county, who have been, with great earnestness and honesty, considering and discussing their duty in this matter, and who expect, and I think are entitled to, something more
than mere authority, as a means of proving to them what is their
duty. They are a people as sincerely devoted to the order of the
State as any other, and as little inclined to reject the acts of their
government as any people in the world. But they have been forced
by circumstances into a review of the fundamental principle of this
case, and I thing that they are entitled to hear something from us
in relation to it. They have gone back into the moral questions
that lie at the foundation of all authority and law, and I am willing
to accompany them there.
I do not again undertake the discussion of the constitutionality of
such Acts of Assembly as the one which enters into the foundation
of this transaction. This court has already expressed itself as well
as it could on that subject, and now we have quite another question
before us. Then it was a question simply of the constitutionality
of the law. Now it is a question of the validity of contracts in
which the law is only one of the elements.
Many times the legislature has passed such laws. It has passed
many for the benefit of Allegheny county and its cities; and always,
we may presume from our knowledge of legislative customs, always
at the instance of the members from Allegheny, who thought they
were properly representing the will of their constituents, and we
hear of none of them having been rebuked for their acts in this
respect. These laws were to have no operation without the assent
of grand juries drawn by lot from the body of its citizens, and of
the county commissioners elected by ballot to manage its financial
affairs. This assent was given on many occasions, and the contracts
were made, and, on the faith of them, with other means, two railroads
were constructed, and four others commenced. None of these things
were hidden from the people of Allegheny county, for they were not
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done in a corner, but openly before the public; and all participated in
them that chose to do so. Newspapers and public meetings freely discussed the subject, and hopes of the subject, and the hopes of the
people bore down all doubt about their right to enter upon the
adventure, and it was only when it was discovered to be unsuccessful that any respectable number became awake to the question of
the constitutionality of their proceeding.
Thus this sort of laws has received the sanction of the executive,
legislature and judiciary of the State, and of the officers, grand
juries and people of the county. Now, therefore, we are not to look
upon the Act of Assembly as being the only authority for the issue
of these bonds, or to suppose that they are to be set aside even if
the unconstitutionality of the act were fully demonstrated. If the
constitution has been violated, it has been done by the combined
act of the government and of the people that were interested in the
question. It is therefore a mistake of the people, as well as of their
functionaries, in relation to the meaning of their own frame of government; and the question now is, who shall bear the consequence of
the mistake? They who made it, or those whom they induced to
trust in them: they who actively or tacitly set aside or misunderstood their own constitutional principles of social authority, or the
stranger, who trusted that the united conduct of the people and of
all their officers was a safe exponent of their principles.
As a moral question, this can receive but one answer. No man
of any tolerable morality would say that those who made the mistake
may honestly cast the loss of it upon those who trusted them as
understanding their own business, their own authority, constitution
and laws. Honest men who would advocate repudiation of such a
contract, could do it only under igorance or forgetfulness of facts
and principles constituting essential elements of the case.
No nation can show better evidence of its title to nationality than
this. No non-constitutional government can more clearly prove its
legitimacy. No national treaty; contract or debt, not even the debts
contracted in our revolution, has a more solid basis of common
assent. Indeed, our revolutionary debts, apart from the elements
of success, had a less solid basis, for they had no constitutional
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authority, and there were more tories then, in proportion, than dissenters from the present contracts.
There was not a man in Allegheny county, who has sense enough
to comprehend a single principle of the case, who did not know that
these things were going on. All knew that thepublic faith was to
be pledged in those transactions. They knew it as a social and not.
an indivirhnal movement. They knew it was a pledge of the public
taxes that was to be made; and if they made no effort to prevent it,
they assented to it, according to the maxim of common sense and
common honesty, that silence gives consent, and which is otherwise
thus expressed-he who is silent! when he ought to speak, must
remain when he wants to speak and ought not.
This is a moral maxim on which is frounded an immense body of legal
rules, which commend themselves to the honesty of every man. We
shall state some of them. A principal is bound by the acts of his
agent, even when he exceeds his authority, if the principal knows
and does not forbid it. If one puts another in a position that gives
him an apparent authority, others may trust to the appearance,
though it may not truly express the real authority vested in the
agent. And if one usurps the position of agent for another, who
sees him thus acting on his behalf, the latter must object to his acts,
or consent to be bound by them. And if one man sells property
as his own, in the presence of the real owner, and without objection
from him, the latter cannot afterwards assert his title.
And the principle lives in full life in international law- Even a
usurping government has authority over those who submit to it, to
bind them towards other persons and nations. If it be in fact the
government, it may do all acts of government, though in moral
principle, it ought to have no authority. It binds the nation by its
acts, and all the people who constitute the nation, whether they
assent or dissent.
If this were not so, no national contracts or treaties could be
proved to be valid; for people -who are devoted to their own form of
government, are very apt to regard all others as illegitimate, republicans generally regard all monarchical governments thus. So far as
relates to strangers, the exercise of authority is proof of its legitimacy.
If it were not so, every person, and every government, having occa-
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sion to treat or contract with another government, would have a right
to investigate and decide upon its legitimacy. More than this; since
nations have a right to demand treaties of each other in order to
regulate their intercourse, each would, on this theory, have a right
to demand that the other should have a legitimate government, that
could enter into a valid treaty; and this would often furnish an
excuse for a strong nation to dictate a form of government to a
weaker one. The contrary principle is therefore impracticable and
would be intolerable.
This authority of even a usurping government is abundantly recgnized as a principle of international law, and might be illustrated
by many instances. We select one from Grecian history-perhaps
an extreme one. When the Thirty Tyrants, an unconstitutional
and usurping government, in the last days of its existance, and as a
means of saving itself from the returning constitutional democracy,
borrowed a large sum of money, the restored Athenian democracy,
taking a large view of the question, resolved to pay the debt out of
the public money, and did so as soon as an exhausted treasury and
impoverished country allowed it.
Let then the Act of Assembly, and the contract of the commissioners, and the active and tacit sanction of nearly all the people,
and the judgment of the Supreme Court; let this be called a usurpation as against those who did not assent; stiil they are bound by
it. As an act of the society to which they belong, they are bound
by it to those who have thus treated with the society, and according to the extent and terms of the authority publicly assumed to be
vested and taken. They cannot partake of the benefits of society
without bearing their share of its risks, burdens and mistakes.
For its social interests, the society to which they belong has acted
as well as it knew how, and all must bear the consequences of its
mistake, as they would have had the advantage of a contrary result.
This is an essential incident of society and of human nature. Man
is made for society, and is morally bound to associate. He cannot
otherwise fulfil his destiny. He is therefore bound to give form to
society; that is, to institute government and live under it. He cannot reject government because its form does not please him. The
best government that a given association of men can make, must be
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legitimate for them and for the time. Even those who object to it
must bear with others the consequences of its defects. This is naturral necessity. In the present case, this people with as good a form
of government as they know how to make, have brought upon themselves this evil, and common jnstice forbids them to throw it over
upon others.
They cannot disown their government and reject its authority
because of a mistake. This would be the worst of all remedies. Is
prope, ty more valuable than government, and peace and order?
Property without government is good for nothing, because property
is never cared for or sought after, or valued when acquired, when
it is unsecured by social order and the sacredness of social forms.
In savage life and in lawless societies, property is valueless, because
it has not these securities. According to these forms, as society
has honestly understood them, and under their highest sanction,
these contracts stand approved as valid contracts of the county.
To repudiate them now is to cast down the very safeguards of liberty
and property. It is to fly from evils that we know and can measure,
to those which the future only can reveal. When, after the battle
of A'ginusmu, the victorious generals, with barbarous neglect, left
their dead uncared for, and abandoned their yet living comrades to
perish, with their disabled ships, the Athenian democracy departed
from their accustomed judicial forms in order to hasten their condemnation; but they afterwards sorely repented of it, and Kallixenus,
the senator who led them astray, driven into exile, and detested by
all, died of hunger.
And suppose that, on a very refined and scientific argument, and
by the aid of some of the essential principles of human nature,
revealed to scientific men by the study of political ethics and natural
law, it might be logically demonstrated that the law in question is
unconstitutional. Is the defence thereby made out ? Very far from
it. A people does not act upon these principles only, perhaps not
at all on some of them, but on the faith that is in them, and upon
the common customs and principles that constitute the atmosphere
of their social life. Locke's Carolina Constitutions, and the French
Constitutions of the Revolution, and the various systems of socialism,
were the product of these scientific principles, and they perish as
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soon as applied to the life of the people; Plato's Republic and Moore's
Utopia, and Harrington's Oceana, never were found worthy of trial.
The scientific theory that would inaugurate only men of what is
called science called science only power, and give them all authority,
is a most slavish one; for it would leave nothing to the free and
spontaneous growth of man. The kind of scientific men that we
need for such matters, is honest and generous minded men-not
living on theories and abstractions, but having an earnest and intelligent comprehension of the actual life of the people, with its needs
and wishes and faith; and knowing bow to aid them in their social
aspirations. We want men with knowledge, not so much of what
human nature ought to be and is to be, as what it now is, to point us
to our present duty.
And if the people do not follow the dictates of science in making.
their engagements, they can hardly justify themselves in resorting
to science as a test of the validity of their engagements, and as a
means to get clear of them at the expense of others. If people
follow out their ordinary principles in making their engagements,
and then trust to logic and science to aid the suggestion of selfishness, that their engagements are not binding, they surrender their
conscience to the keeping of others whom they cannot entirely understand.
The Algerines were more consistent,-when, in 1686, some English
puritans petitioned them to abolish s.avery of Christians, and piracy.
It was argued in the Divan, that this would depreciate all their
property, create general discontent and confusion, and excite insurrection, to the prejudice of the faithful, and in favor of the dreams
of a small number of puritans; and they decided that, whether piracy
and slavery of Christians was unjust or not, was at least doubtful,
but they were clearly for'the interest of the State, and therefore the
petition was rejected. They refused to abandon their customary
views of justice upon an argument that was not conclusive to their
minds. Whether this is history or fiction, it will answer for an
illustration.
When people shall have discovered the exact boundary between
engagements that are peculiarly social, and those which are peculiarly
individual, then possibly they may be morally entitled to declare
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that they and their governor and legislature, and judiciary, have
violated their constitution in making such contracts. But even then
they cannot honestly retrace their steps, without making restitution
to those whom they have misled. We cannot doubt that these bonds
are legally obligatory on the county of Allegheny, to the extent
expressed in the opinion delivered by my brother Woodward.
The opinions here expressed must be taken as exclusively my own,
for I do not understand them as being adopted by any of my brethren.
They are necessary, or at least very important, to my mind in coming
to the conclusions expressed in our judgment, and therefore I am
constrained to express them.

In the Court of ApI)eals of the State of New York.
GROSVENOR

VS. ATLANTIC

MUTUAL INSURANCE

COMPANY OF BROOKLYN.

1. Where a mortgagor, after assigning a policy of insurance to secure his mortgage
debt, alienes, no recovery upon the policy in case of subsequent. loss can be had
by the mortgagee.
2. The mortgagee takes the assignment with knowledge that the contract of insurance may be avoided by a failure on the part of the mortgagor, the assured, to
perform any of the conditions of the policy.
3. Such transfer to a mortgagee is merely an appointment to receive any money
which may become due from the insurers by reason of loss sustained by the mortgagor.
4. As the rights of the appointee are wholly derivative, and cease with the determination of the m-rtgagor's interest, no contract on the part. of the insurers is
created by such transter, to indemnify the mortgagee against loss.

The opinion of the court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
J.-The contract of insurance, is a contract of indemnity. To sustain an action upon such a contract, it must appear
that the party insured has sustained a loss. This involves the
necessity of an insurable interest at the time of the alleged loss.
Without such interest the party insured cannot be damnified.
In this case, the contract was between the defendants and
McCarty. The agreement was to insure "Eugene W. 'McCarty
against loss or damage by fire, to the amount of $7,000, on his thrce
story brick dwelling house." But after the contract was made, and
before the alleged loss, McCarty had sold and conveyed the proHARRIS,
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perty insured. At the time of the fire he had no insurable interest,
of course he has no claim for indemnity. iNo action, therefore,
could be maintained upon the policy by 'McCarty.
But at the time the insurance was effected, the plaintiff in this
action, Grosvenor, was the holder of a mortgage upon the premises insured. As such mortgagee, he too had an insurable interest. The extent of that interest was the amount of his debt. To
that extent he might have contracted with the defendants to indemnify him against loss by fire. The payment of his debt would as
completely terminate the contract to insure, as would the alienation
of the property, when the contract is made with the owner.
The important inquiry in this case is, to which of these classes
does the contract in question belong. The action is brought by the
plaintiff as mortgagee. The contract was made with McCarty, the
mortgagor. But the policy provides, that, in case of loss, such loss
should be payable to the plaintiff. What is the legal effect of this
provision? Without it, the plaintiff could have had no claim against
the defendants for indemnity. Is this provision to be regarded as
an appointment of the plaintiff to receive any money which might
become due from the insurers by reason of any loss sustained by the
mortgagor ? or, has it the effect to render the policy, which would
otherwise be a contract to indemnify the mortgagor against loss,
contract to indemnify the mortgagee ? A determination of this
question will also determine the rights of the parties to this action.
Were it not for one or two decisions in this State bearing upon
the question, I should have little difficulty in pronouncing in favor
of the former of these propositions. It seems to me to be very clear,
that it was the intention of all the parties that the interest of the
mortgagor, and not that of the mortgagee, should be insured. It
is stated in the policy, that the property insured is the property of
McCarty, and that he is the person insured. McCarty paid the
premium. Ile made the contract. His interest, as owner, and not
that of the plaintiff, as mortgagee, was the subject of the insurance.
The plaintiff was merely the appointee of the party insured to
receive the money which might become due him from the insurers
upon the contract. The provision in the policy in this respect, had
no more effect upon the contract itself, than it would if it had been
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provided that the loss for which the insurers should become liable,
should be deposited in a specified bank to the credit of the party
insured.
Suppose that the plaintiff, although described in the policy as a
mortgagee, had in fact held no mortgage; could it be pretended
that the defendants might have avoided the policy on the ground
that the plaintiff had no insurable interest ? Or suppose again that
after the contract had been made, the mortgage had been paid,
could it be claimed that the contract to insure had also ceased ? I
presume none will deny that, in either case, the contract would
have continued in force for the benefit of the owner of the property
insured. If so it must have been because the interest of the mortgagor, and not that of the mortgagee was the thing insured. I
agree with the court below, " that there is nothing in the language
of the policy on which the court can adjudge, that in legtal effect it
is a contract insuring the interest of the mortgagee as such, except
inthe provision which declares that the loss, if any, which accrues
under the contract insuring the mortgagor's interest shall be payable
to the mortgagee. That provision merely designates a person to
whom such loss is to be pid, and shows that he is a person who may
have an interest in its being so paid."
The undertaking to pay the plaintiff, was an undertaking collateral to, and dependent upon the principal undertaking to insure the
mortgagor. The effect of it was, that the defendants agreed that
-whenever any money should become due to the mortgagor upon the
contract of insurance, they would, instead of paying it to the mortgagor himself, pay it to the plaintiff. The mortgagor must sustain
a loss for which the insurers were liable, before the party appointed
to receive the money would have a right to claim it. It is the
damage sustained by the party insured, and not by the party appointed to receive payment, that is recoverble from the insurers, see
Mllacomber vs. the Cambridge Mutual Fire Insuravee 0o., 8 Cushing, 133. The insurance being upon the interest of the mortgagor,
and he having parted with that interest before the fire, no loss was
sustained by him, and of course none was recoverable by his assignee
or appointee; the right of such a party being wholly derivative,
cannot exceed the right of the party under whom he claims ; see also
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Carpentervs. The Providence WashingtonInsuranceCo., 16 Peters,
495; Foster vs. The -EquitableFire Insurance Co., 2 Gray, 216.
I agree with the learned judges who delivered opinions upon the
decision of this case in the court below, that there is no just ground
for discrimination between this case, and that of an assignment of
the policy to a mortgagee to be held by him, as collateral security
for his debt, with the consent of the insurer. In either case, the
insurance is upon the interest of the mortgagor. The terms and
conditions upon which indemnity may be claimed are agreed upon,
and then the original parties further agree, that when by the terms and
conditions of the contract the insurers shall become liable by reason
of a loss sustained by the party insured, the money shall be paid,
not to the party who has sustained the loss, but to his appointee or
assignee for his benefit. Such an appointment or assignment ought
not to be construed so as to vary, in any respect, the liabilities of
the insurers upon their original contract. It is certainly true, as
was said by Mr. Justice Woodruff, "that when applied to other
agreements for the payment of money, an assignment does no more
than direct to whom it shall be paid when it shall become due."
The case of the Traders' Insarance Co. vs. flobert, 9 Wend.
404, was, in my judgment, erroneously decided; and unless by subsequent recognition or acquiescence, it has become so securely imbedded in the law of this State that it may not be disturbed, it
ought not to be followed. It was a condition of the policy in that
case, that it should cease if the assured should effect a further insurance upon the property and should omit to give notice of such
further insurance within a reasonable time. The policy in question
was assigned to a mortgagee, with the assent of the insurers. After
this assignment the party insured effected a further insurance with
another company and neglected to give the requisite notice. It
was held that the being action brought by the assignee of the policy,
though in the name of his assignor, no act of the latter, after the
assignment, could be allowed to prejudice the rights of the former.
The argument by which this result was reached seems to me to
have been singularly illogical and inconclusive. Indeed it depends
entirely upon the misapplication of a very familiar principle.
"1Had the nominal plaintiff executed a release to the insurance corn-
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pany," say the court, "it would have no effect upon the rights of
the assignee. And if he could not directly discharge the right of
action which he had assigned, surely he cannot do it indirectly.
The fact of his having effected a subsequent insurance upon the
same premises, can have no influence upon the rights of the real
plaintiff in this suit." It is quite obvious, I think, that the learned
judge who delivered the opinion, entirely failed to discriminate between acts done for the purpose of discharging the liability of the
insurers upon their contract and acts which by the terms of the contract were necessary in order to continue such liability. All will
agree in the soundness of the premises upon which the argument is
founded. It is true, that the assignor of a right in action cannot
indirectly, any more than he can directly do any thing which will
discharge the liability of the other contracting party to his assignee.
Bat it is equally true, that where such liability is, by the terms of
the contract, made to depend upon the performance of an act by
the assignor, an assignment of the contract will not operate to dispense with the performance of the act as a condition of liability.
It had been stipulated between the contracting parties, that if the
assured should effect a further insurance, and should omit to give
notice to the insurers of such further insurance, the whole contract
should be at an end. This was the condition upon which the insurers were to continue liable. It was no less a condition after the
assignment, than before. The assignee took the contract with
knowledge, that it might be avoided by a failure to perform this
condition. The inference of the court, therefore, that because the
assignor of a right in action cannot directly or indirectly release
such right of action to the prejudice of his assignee, the fact, that
subsequent to the assignment of the policy the assignor effected a
further insuranee without giving notice as required by the terms of
the policy, could have no influence upon the rights of the assignee, is
not justified.
Again, it is said by the court, in The Traders' Insurance Co. vs.
-obert, after the assignment of the policy to Bolton the mortgagee, Robert, in whose name it was originally taken, had no
interest in it, and that the rights of the parties were the same as if
the policy had been given to Bolton." This, too, is an obvious
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error. Robert was as much interested in the policy after he had
assigned it to his creditor as before. The money for which the
insurers might become liable, was to be applied to his use. The
only effect of the assignment was to make a specific appropriation
of the money beforehand, to the payment of a specific debt. The
i isurance was for the benefit of the owner of the property by whom
it was obtained, but it was convenient for him, as in the case now
in hand, to appoint the particular creditor who should receive the
money in case of a loss. The real interest of the party insured
remained unchanged.
From the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Traders'
Insurance Co. vs. Robert, as there was no appeal, the decision was
suffered to become the law of the case. There stood upon the'
records of the court an absolute, unimpeachable and irrevocable
judgment in favor of Robert against the Insurance Company ; the
legal title to the judgment was in Robert. A contingent equitable
interest was vested in Bolton, the assignee of the policy. That
interest was extinguished by the payment of the debt, to secure
which it had been assigned. Thus the entire equitable, as well as
legal right to the judgment, became vested in Robert the plaintiff.
Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court, as though aware of
the injustice which its decision was likely to work out, made an
order, upon motion of the defendants in the judgment, staying all
further proceedings thereon, thus practically reversing their own
judgment in the case. This order was reversed by the court for the
correction of errors, and, in my judgment, very properly. The
decision was put upon the ground, that, as a valid judgment had
been obtained upon the policy, the payment by Robert of the debt
to Bolton, for the security of which the policy had been assigned,
"had no other effect than to bring back to him that interest in the
policy which he had assigned, and of course the interests also in the
judgment which had been obtained upon the policy; see Robert vs.
The Traders' Insurance Co., 17 Wend. 631.
Were the question left here, I should have little hesitation in
saying that the judgment of this court ought not to be controlled
by the decision in the Traders' Ins. Co. vs. Robert. But the same
question was before this court in Tillow vs. The Zingston Mutual
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Ins. Co., 1 Seld. 405, and was disposed of in a similar way. In
that case, the insurance had been effected by three partners, and
the policy had been assigned to a mortgagee of the premises to secure
his debt. Aifterwards, one of the partners sold out and released to
his copartners his interest in the property insured. A loss having
occurred, an action was brought upon the policy in the name of all
three of the partners. The action was defended on the ground that
the policy had been rendered void by the alienation. The Supreme
Court held, that the transfer of the interest of one partner to his
copartners, was not such an alienation of the property as would
avoid the policy. Judgment was accordingly rendered against the
company for the full amount of the loss. The case being brought
into this court, upon appeal, it was held here, upon the authority of
MLrdock vs. The Chenango County Mutual Ins Co., 2 Oomst. 210,
that the plaintiffs could not recover, for their own benefit, on the
ground that one of the plaintiffs had no interest in the action. The
question now before the court was decided entirely upon the authority
of Robert vs. The Traders' Ins. Co., and, I think I may be allowed
to ad 1, without much consideration. The learned judge who pronounced the opinion of the court, though he had been successful

in the case of Robert vs. The Traders' -14s. Co., evidently
misapprehended the value of that case as an authority. For he
says, after stating the point decided by the Supreme Court, that
"the case afterwards came, in a different form, before the court for
the correction of errors, and that court recognized, approved and
substantially affirmed the judgment." In this, I think, he was mistaken. I have already noticed the circumstances under which the
case came before the court of errors, and shown that the question
now under consideration had already passed beyond the reach of
that court. Had it not been so, the report of the case furnishes
strong ground for the belief that the result would have been different.
The learned judge, further to sustain the authority of Robert vs.
The Traders' Ins. Co., and to show that the question ought to be
regarded as closed against further consideration, proceeded to say,
that the case had already been twice noticed by this court, and each
time with approbation. In support of this statement he refers to
Conover vs. The 3lutual Ins. Co. of Albany, 1 Comst. 293, and
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Murdock vs. The Ohenango County Mutual Ins. Co., above cited.
In the former of these cases, Judge T. A. Johnson, in delivering the
opinion of the court, says, "We are not called upon to decide
whether the absolute alienation by Conover, after the assignment of
the policy, is a good defence. The point was not raised on the
trial. But, if it were, I do not see how the interest of the assignee
could be affected by it." He then cites The Traders' Ins. Co. vs.
Robert, 9 Wend. 404. Such a notice of an authority, it seems to me,
can add but little to its judicial efficacy. In the other case, the approbation is still more faint. Indeed, I construe it into positive
disapprobation. Judge Cady, who alone alluded to this authority,
says, "it may well be doubted whether the court in that case did
not go too far in order to protect the assignee."
Thus the question stands upon authority. Tillou vs. Eingston
Mutual Ins. Co. contains the only adjudication upon the point in
this court. Of that case, it is not too much to say, that it was
decided without much examination, the court relying chiefly upon the
authority of Robert vs. The Traders' Ins. Co. The value of that
case, as- a precedent, was, as I have attemped to show, entirely
over-estimated. Believing, as I do, that it was decided upon mistaken views of the law, applicable to the question involved, and that
the decision of the Supreme Court never had the sanction *of the
court for the correction of errors, and that the case in this court
was determined upon a misapprehension of what had before been
adjudged, I regard the question as yet open for the consideration of
this court.
Upon the merits of the question I have already sufficienitly expressed the convictions of my own judgment. The defendants
contracted with McCarty and not the plaintiff. They agreed, upon
the performance of certain conditions, to pay for him to the plaintiff
certain money. Some of these conditions were positive in their
character-others negative-certain things were to be done by the
assured, and other things were not to be done. If all these conditions were performed, then, if a loss occurred, the defendants
agreed to indemnify him against that loss to the extent specified in
the policy, and he appointed the plaintiff, his creditor, to receive
from the defendants the amount for which they were thus contin-
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gently liable. The terms of this contract have never been waived,
relaxed or modified. The defendants have shown an express violation of one or more of the conditions upon which the liability was
to depend. And yet it has been adjudged, although it is evident
that it has been done with reluctance and against the better judgment of the court making the decision, that the proof of these
violations constituted no defence to the action. The judgment
should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the
event.
I-n the District Court of _PhiladelpTia.
PENROSE vs. THE ERIE

CANAL COMPANY.

1. The fnnd. of an inwolvent corporation in the hands of a banker, are liable to
executiton attachment by a creditor of the corporation, and it is no defence that
the banker is alao a creditor of the corporation to an amount exceeding the funds
in his hands.
2. Money of a company deposited by the treasurer as such, is the money of the
corporation in the hands of the banker.

This was a motion for a new trial and judgment on points
reserved at the trial. The necessary facts appear in the opinion of
SHARswooD, P. J.-This is an attachment execution issued on a
judgment against the Erie Canal Company, and served on Chas. L.
Reed. From the answers of the garnishees and the other evidence, all
documentary, produced on the trial, it appears that David McAlister, the treasurer of the company defendant, keeps an account
with 'Mr. Reed-depositing his moneys with him-and the collectors
of tolls also paying their money to Mr. Reed to the credit of the
account of the treasurer. The Erie Canal Company is insolvent,
unable to pay the principal or even interest of its bonds which have
matured.
The most it has been able to do, after providing for current
expenses and necessary repairs, has been to pay three per cent. to
its bondholders on account of interest. Mr. Reed is the president
of the company, the largest stockholder, and holds of its bonds,
matured and unpaid, to the amount of $500,000 and upwards.
The plaintiff's judgment is for the principal of bonds of the same
character.
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It will be best to consider the points of the case as they were presented in the able argument of the gentleman from Erie, who appeared on behalf of the garnishee. It exhausted all that could be
said on the subject.
It was contended, in the first place, that General Reed was the
debtor of David McAlister, not of the Erie Canal Company. But
is this so ? If sued by the company, must not a recovery be had
against the garnishee-could he set-off a debt due by McAlister ?
If McAlister were superseded and a new treasurer appointed, with
notice to General Reed, could he any longer honor with safety Mr.
McAlister's checks ? It is answer enough to this question to say,
that the money deposited with Mr. Reed is the money of the company, and he knows it. The account is kept in the name of David
McAlister, treasurer, and his receipts show that he received the
money for the uses and purposes of the company, and to be accounted for to them. There is nothing, then, in this first point,-it is the
ordinary ease of a debt due to a corporation.
The second ground taken is, that the funds in General Reed's
hands is simply money in the treasury, and not therefore liable to
attachment. It may be that the money of a corporation, in the
safe keeping of its cashier, treasurer or other officer, is not liable to
attachment. Money in the cashier's pocket or strong box is in the
pocket or strong-box of the corporation-he is but a servant, not
a debtor of the corporation. Were he robbed, he could plead the
loss, without negligence on his part, in discharge.
But suppose General Reed were robbed, does he say that he kept
the money of the company in a box or bag, by itself, distinguished
from his own, so that if lost by fire or robbery he would be discharged ? He could no more do so than a debtor could plead any
calamity or loss he had met with to excuse the payment of his debt.
Their funds he holds as a banker, mixed with his own, not as the
servant of the company or of the treasurer.
It will make this point stronger, though strong enough without,
to add, that for -more than enough to pay plaintiff's claim, General
Reed was under contract to pay interest.
The third point was that an attachment will not lie against an
insolvent corporation; or, perhaps as it was modified, an insolvent
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corporation entrusted with the construction and management of
some public highway or improvement.
But where is the authority for this position to be found? No
distinction, as far as attachments are concerned, is made between
improvement and other corporations, although, in the process of
sequestration, such a distinction is made between municipal and other
The reference to the act of 1836 in the act of
corporations.
1845, is too vague to justify us in incorporating the proviso as to
sequestration on the process of attachment. The reference is more
fit to those sections of the act of 1836 which regulate attachments.
Nor do the special acts passed in reference to sequestrations against
this company, at all reach this process.
I have thus disposed of all the points but one, which was considered by the counsel under the first head-That General Reed
instead of being the debtor, was in fact the creditor of defendants
to an amount much larger than all the funds in his hands.
The answer is that there is fairly to be implied from the relation
of banker to the company, as well as the terms of his receipts, that
he was not to plead a set-off, but to account for and pay over whatever moneys thus came to his hands as banker ; but a contract, express or implied, precludes his off-set. Renniss vs. Page, 3 Wh.
275; Banc of U. S. vs. M11acalester, 9 Barr, 475. It has been
urged, however, that though a contract not to defalcate against the
company may be, there is nothing from which a contract not to avail
himself of his set-off against a creditor coming on the funds by process in mortum, and having no better equity to be paid than himself, can be implied.
But how is this distinction to be practically carried out ? It is
clear that the company could demand the debt of General Reed for
any purpose-he could not take defence, as to them, that they
meant with the money to pay the plaintiff. The attachment places
the judgment creditor in the shoes of the debtor, with all his rights
and privileges, just as he stood at the date of the attachment ; it is
to all intents and purposes a statute assignment of the debt by the
defendant to the plaintiff in the execution. In re Baldwin's -Estate,
4 Barr, 248.
Rule discharged, and judgment for plaintiff.

